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Purpose: Existing frameworks for understanding and analyzing the value configuration and structuring of partner-
ships in relation such network-based business models are found to be inferior. The purpose of this paper is there-
fore to broaden our understanding of how business models may change over time and how the role of strategic 
partners may differ over time too. 
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Findings: This paper illustrates how a network-based business model arises and evolves and how the forces of a 
network structure impact the development of its partner relationships. The contribution of this article is to under-
standing how partners positioned around a business model can be organized into a network-based business model 
that generates additional value for the core business model and for both the partners and the customers.
Research limitations/implications: The results should be taken with caution as they are based on the case study 
of a single network-based business model. 
Practical implications: Managers can gain insight into barriers and enablers relating to different types of loose 
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Introduction
In the near future, when markets are expected to be-
come truly globalized and where technological develop-
ments potentially will enable even micro-companies to 
tap into global supply chains with great ease and flex-
ibility, and where the same companies have the ability 
to reach global consumers and business-to-business 
marketplaces through the Internet, established compa-
nies will need to understand new ways of collaboration 
in order to sustain their businesses. The overall trend 
clearly points towards more collaboration between or-
ganizations (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999). In such a setting, 
the ability to create profitable network-based business 
models will become ever more crucial. 
The ongoing global financial crises illustrates that in a 
global business cycle downturn, companies tend to fo-
cus on cutting their costs to a minimum, in turn reducing 
key resources and activities in their respective business 
models. Inevitably, such cost-cutting exercises will result 
in restrictions to the value proposition for customers. 
However, imagine the case where creating a network-
based business model leads to both lower unit costs and 
a higher value proposition seen from the perspective of 
the customers. It is the objective of this longitudinal case 
study to understanding how partners positioned around 
a business model can be organized into a network-based 
business model that generates additional value for the 
core business model for both the partners and the cus-
tomers. The ability to create such a structure ought to 
be the primary objective of any network-based business 
model in order to outweigh deficiencies such as lacking 
control, trust and inefficiencies.
In most cases when a company cuts it cost-base, take 
for example an airline carrier, it will have an impact on 
the service-level provided to the customers. Routes 
may be closed, flight-frequency reduced, service desks 
in local airports closed, in-flight service reduced etc. 
and all of these factors have a very direct impact on 
the value proposition towards the customer. In a recent 
contribution, Rindova et al. (2012) identifying three 
mechanisms linking partnering portfolios in strategic 
entrepreneurial networks that have an impact on firm 
growth: 1) configuring partnering portfolios to pursue 
distinctive logics for sourcing external resources, 2) 
aligning resource-sourcing and resource-linking log-
ics in new product development, and 3) embarking on 
different growth trajectories, which contribute to dif-
ferent performance patterns. Hence, it is an interest-
ing proposition to study whether new network-based 
business models factoring in openness, peering, shar-
ing, and global positioning, could enable the possibility 
of enhancing the value proposition while at the same 
time reducing costs through partnering. This article 
reports the study of a network-based business model 
with precisely this ambition.  
In studying the development of a network-based 
business model, Eye in the Sky (henceforth EIS), from 
an explorative perspective, we are able to map out a 
number of phases over which the business model de-
veloped and the barriers and enablers related to each 
phase. The results of this longitudinal research project 
provide insight into the implications of collaborating on 
delivering value to customers from a network-based 
perspective and provide valuable insight into the inter-
dependent innovation (Kleinbaum & Tushman 2007) 
from inter-firm perpsective. Furthermore, this research 
provides a strong theoretical contribution relating to 
the tools for analyzing, developing and optimizing 
business models, in that the study finds weaknesses 
in relation to properly understanding and modeling the 
value creation that takes place between existing busi-
ness models in the form of strategic partnerships and 
transactions. This study accentuates previous studies 
in the field. In particular, we advance the findings of 
Demil and Lecocq (2010), who also consider business 
model evolution. While Demil and Lecocq (2010) are 
specifically concerned with the dynamics created by 
interactions between a business model’s components, 
this study adds value by reflecting the dynamics cre-
ated in the interactions between a business model’s 
strategic partners.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section two provides theoretical insight into, and dis-
cusses the value configuration of business models while 
the subsequent section reviews the notion of modeling 
network-based business models. Section four accounts 
for the methodology and provides a description of the 
case, while section five illustrates the evolution of “Eye 
in the Sky” network. Finally, the results are discussed 
and related back to theory in section six.  
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Understanding the value configura-
tion of business models
New types of value creation. We have heard that song 
before. In the mid 1990’s there was an overflow of 
literature documenting how new types of value cre-
ation spawned several new fields of interest such as 
e.g. intellectual capital, networks and e-business as 
important “new” drivers of value creation (cf. Zott et 
al. 2011) in the wake of the dot.com era. However, nei-
ther intellectual capital, networks nor e-business are 
by themselves new types of business models. Rather, 
they represent important sub-elements of business 
models. Intellectual capital has e.g. become a greater 
part of competitive advantage, while networks and 
e-business represent choices for customer contacts and 
customer-targeting strategies respectively. Another 
way of denoting this is that the value configurations 
that companies apply to become successful have al-
tered as Sweet pointed out already in 2001. 
Our postulate here is that as new types of value 
configuration emerge, so do new business models. 
Therefore, new models and tools for working with the 
identification, analysis and development of value are 
needed in order to illustrate the effects of managerial 
decisions on value creation. Accordingly, managers 
must recognize that business models are made up of 
portfolios of very different resources such as networks, 
competences, customer loyalty, and not merely tradi-
tional physical and financial assets. Therefore, “every 
company needs to create a business model that links 
combinations of assets to value creation” (Boulton, 
Libert, & Samek 1997, 33). 
The rising interest in understanding and evaluating 
business models (Nielsen 2011) can to some extent be 
traced to the fact that new value configurations are 
starting to outcompete existing ways of doing business. 
Already a decade ago, Sandberg argued that changes 
in the competitive landscape had given rise to a variety 
of new value creation models within industries where 
previously the “name of the industry served as shortcut 
for the prevailing business model’s approach to market 
structure” (Sandberg, 2002; 3) and that competition 
was increasingly between competing business concepts 
(Hamel, 2000) and not between firms with different 
strategies. One attempt at defining what a business 
model is states that “A business model describes the 
coherence in the strategic choices which makes possible 
the handling of the processes and relations which cre-
ate value on both the operational, tactical and strategic 
levels in the organization. The business model is there-
fore the platform which connects resources, processes 
and the supply of a service which results in the fact that 
the company is profitable in the long term” (ANON.). 
As such this idea correlates with Hamel’s arguments 
and emphasizes that a business model is the platform, 
which enables the strategic choices to become profit-
able (see also Seddon et al. 2004). 
Resources are often mentioned as central aspects in 
business model frameworks (Betz 2002). Klaila (2000) 
explains how the description of a business model helps, 
e.g. managers and employees, to identify the critical 
behaviors, competencies, and market conditions and 
account for the key resources that are present in the 
company. From such a resource-based perspective 
these resources are key inputs to the value creation 
process of the company (Boulton et al., 1997). As it, for 
some organisations at least, can be rather complex to 
understand the roles of the many different resources in 
the total value creation of the company (Covin & Stivers, 
1997), the business model approach becomes advanta-
geous, because it, in the words of Miller, Eisenstat & 
Foote (2002) visualizes the capability configurations 
of the company, understood as the cohesive combina-
tion of resources and capabilities embedded within its 
infrastructure that generate value. 
The value chain is a typical example of a value con-
figuration. Porter defines the value chain as a tool for 
analyzing the sources of competitive advantage of the 
firm because “The value chain enables a systematic ex-
amination of all the activities a firm performs and how 
these activities interact” (Porter, 1985; p. 33). Every 
firm is essentially a collection of interdependent activi-
ties that are performed to create value. According to 
Shank and Govindarajan (1992) the value chain is “the 
linked set of value-creating activities all the way from 
basic raw materials to the ultimate end-use product 
delivered into the final consumers’ hands” (ibid., 179). 
Within the notions of business models, the value chain 
is argued to comprise the activities and organization 
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of the company (Hedman & Kalling 2003) and the 
structure of the company (Alt & Zimmermann 2001). In 
Bell et al.’s (1997) client business model framework for 
example, core business processes and activities, and 
the analysis hereof, are also viewed from a value chain 
perspective. Likewise, Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
(2002) imply that the value chain perspective leads to 
the identification of the activities and assets (inputs) 
that are necessary to deliver the value proposition of 
the company (outputs). 
However, there are alternative value configuration 
models to that of the value chain. Stabell & Fjeldstad 
(1998, 414) suggest that the value chain is but one of 
three generic value configuration models. Based on 
Thompson’s (1967) typology of long-linked, intensive 
and mediating technologies, they define the value 
chain as a value configuration that models the ac-
tivities of long-linked technology. Stabell & Fjeldstad 
(1998) argue that the distinction between these three 
generic value configuration models is the key to being 
able to analyze firm-level value creation. 
Sweet (2001) identifies four strategic value configura-
tion logics: value-adding, -extracting, -capturing, and 
-creating and argues that it is the ability to manage 
these logics well, rather than the ability to create new 
business models that leads to sustainable success. By 
stating this, he confirms the necessity of understand-
ing how the business model and its value creating 
elements work, as a prerequisite for managing the 
company. Ramirez (1999) too, offers an alternative 
view to that associated with value creation in industrial 
production, arguing that technical breakthroughs and 
social innovations in actual value creation render the 
alternative, a so-called value co-production framework. 
The first of the two alternative generic value configu-
ration models proposed by Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998) 
is the value network logic. It models firms that create 
value by facilitating a network relationship between 
their customers using a mediating technology, e.g. 
like an infomediary or innomediary, as Sawhney et al. 
(2003) explicates. The second alternative to the value 
chain is the value shop logic. It concerns firms where 
value is created by mobilizing resources and activities 
to resolve a particular customer problem. Hence, both 
of these value configuration logics have significant 
similarities to our network-based business model 
setting. 
This discussion naturally leads us to the field of net-
works, which has rendered much attention in recent 
years (cf. Castells 2000) and network analysis in order 
to frame an understanding of network-based busi-
ness models. A network consists of specific roles and 
value interactions oriented toward the achievement 
of a particular task or outcome (Allee, 2008). Despite 
the fact that there has been a significant amount of 
attention directed towards understanding the role 
of interorganizational networks and alliances (Gulati 
1998) and for example which contingencies that affect 
the success or failure of a relationship, (cf. Batonda & 
Perry, 2003; p. 1), very little attention has been directed 
towards the evolution of networks (Anderson et al., 
1994; Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). 
Batonda & Perry (2003) describe three schools in rela-
tion to network evolution: stage-theory, state-theory 
and joinings theory. The stage-theory contains two 
main theories: life cycle models and growth-stages 
models (Batonda & Perry, 2003; 1458), both focusing 
on how inter-firm networks gradually develop through 
sequential stages, and over a period of time (see also 
Ford, 1980; Van de Ven, 1992). State-theory comes 
from a different school of thought, and is in opposition 
to the sequenciality thoughts on which stage-theory 
is based. Instead, state-theory suggests that actors 
in a collaboration move randomly from one state to 
another (Anderson et al., 1994; Håkansson & Snehota, 
1995). Joining-theory is more centered on what hap-
pens at the beginning of a network and how the entry 
has a major influence on the further development of 
the network (Thorelli 1986, Batonda & Perry 2003). This 
could for example be the case when the way in which 
partners are identified and recruited has an influence 
on the outcome of the network.  
Batonda & Perry (2003) conclude that companies that 
are new in network settings often tend to think of 
the collaborations as following a sequence of stages, 
while more established companies or companies that 
are network-based themselves tend to accept the ap-
proach of the state-theory. Finally, Batonda & Perry 
(2003) argue that joining-theory is not applicable when 
focusing on inter-firm network development. This 
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study will utilize these experiences when conducting 
the research, but before outlining the specific use, it is 
necessary to describe the context of network analysis.
According to Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook (2001), net-
work analysis is based on the recognition that network 
structure constrains and at the same time is shaped 
by firms’ actions (Granovetter, 1973; Nohria, 1992), and 
provides a series of techniques to map out the struc-
ture of interorganisational relationships. Lazzarini et 
al. (2001) introduce the concept of netchain analysis, 
which provides a framework, which is able to encom-
pass the value-shop and value-network configurations 
of Stabell and Fjellstad (1998) and thereby constitutes 
a viable framework for analyzing network-based busi-
ness models. A netchain analysis explicitly differenti-
ates between horizontal (transactions in the same 
layer of the value chain) and vertical ties (transactions 
between layers), mapping how agents in each layer 
are related to each other and to agents in other lay-
ers (Lazzarini et al., 2001; p. 7). The framework distin-
guishes between three types of interdependence in the 
network, namely sequential, pooled and reciprocal each 
of which spurs distinctly different types of value crea-
tion sources. 
Allee (2008) argues that in order to facilitate the analy-
sis of the value of a network, knowledge and intangible 
value exchanges must become an integrated part of 
the models applied in visualizing value configurations 
along side that of information, physical and monetary 
transactions. Even if network analysis is becoming 
more and more important, only few studies have con-
templated how the intangible resources of companies 
interact to create value for the whole network (Allee, 
2008; Solitander and Tidström, 2010; Peng, 2011; 
ANON.). 
In the words of Zott and Amit (2009), business models 
go well beyond traditional views on network theory and 
emphasize the inclusion of factors such as purpose, ac-
ceptance, fairness, coherence and viability. Our synthe-
sis here is therefore that the business model consti-
tutes a value creation “core” based on the interaction 
of a number of generic building blocks (cf. Chesbrough, 
2006; Osterwalder & Pigneur 2009), and that it is em-
bedded in a network of partners and alliances that con-
tribute to value creation through supplying resources 
or performing activities and that these partners are 
not only restricted to interacting on the traditional 
value chain perspective, but can perform downstream 
customer activities and even core value proposition en-
hancing activities. This is much in accordance with Zott 
and Amit (2010), who argue that a business model is 
a system of interdependent activities that transcends 
the focal firm and spans its boundaries and that the 
activity system enables the firm, in concert with its 
partners, to create value.
The process of designing network-
based business models
One way of visualizing a business model is through 
the Business Model Canvas, a conceptual tool devel-
oped by Osterwalder & Pigneur from ca. 2003 to 2009 
(Osterwalder & Pigneur 2009). The Business Model 
Canvas describes a business model as being based on 
nine interrelated building blocks where the centrally 
placed value proposition links the infrastructure of the 
company (down-stream activities) with the customer 
(distribution and after sales relationships). 
Osterwalder & Pigneur’s work (cf. Osterwalder 2004, 
Osterwalder, Pigneur and Tucci 2004; Osterwalder 
and Pigneur 2009) has provided a popular framework 
for describing, understanding and developing busi-
ness models. This is primarily due to the fact that the 
canvas is an intuitively applied template from which to 
discuss the “how’s” and “why’s” of the activities and 
choices made by a company in order to achieve a sus-
tainable position in their industry. The model does not 
prescribe any particular starting point for the analysis, 
or any particular order of discussion. Rather, it prompts 
the user(s) to focus on natural connectivities between 
the nine building blocks that make up the model. 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2009) propose a process of ap-
plying the canvas to describe the “as-is” model of the 
organization, and thereafter to focus on strengths and 
weaknesses and finally try to narrow down potential 
“could-be’s” and evaluating this business model in-
novation in a SWOT-like manner. A limitation to the 
framework is the static nature of the business model 
canvas, in view of the desire to generate new innova-
tive business models.
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Furthermore, the Business Model Canvas framework 
encounters limitations in cases where several com-
panies and individuals form a network in a new busi-
ness model. There seems to be a need to develop an 
additional layer to the framework for each partner 
(stakeholder) and for the network at a whole so that it 
may encompass the network of partners and alliances 
that contribute to value creation through supplying 
resources or performing activities as described in sec-
tion 2 above. A network-based business model is a 
business model where two or more, and often several, 
stakeholders create a joint value proposition or jointly 
affect a value proposition based on the key activities 
and resources of all stakeholders. The partners are not 
only restricted to interacting in a traditional value chain 
manner i.e. sequentially (Lazzarini et al. 2001), but can 
perform downstream customer activities and even core 
value proposition enhancing activities. 
A company’s ability to tap into and again tap out of 
these networks, interorganisational relationships 
and processes and its ability to innovate across the 
network capabilities that present themselves; will 
become a competitive advantage in itself. The notable 
success of several innovative network-based business 
models in recent years ,such as Apples network of 
App-companies and Groupon’s success with merging 
sellers and buyers, supports the notion of including 
business partners in the design and innovation process 
of business models. Network-based business models 
may be constructed in a variety of ways. Below we pro-
vide a number of examples that illustrate this.
Figure 2: Partners can influence value creation
A network-based business model in the context of 
the Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur 
2009) seems to lack an additional layer to capture the 
network dimension. The Business Model Canvas it self 
contains a building block entitled “network partners” 
enabling the user to identify who the key partners and 
suppliers are, which resources they are providing and 
which activities they perform. In the Business Model 
Canvas, the partners have a direct effect on the key 
resources and activities affecting the cost structure of 
Figure 1: The Business Model Canvas
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the company. If we take the example of an oil driller 
that offers owners of oilfield to develop, drill and pro-
duce oil they become a key partner in the business 
model of the oilfield owner. Figure 2 illustrates that the 
oil driller provides key resources; pioneering technolo-
gies, experienced personnel and machinery. They can 
implement key activities; preforming all tasks in drill-
ing and processing the oil affecting the cost structure 
and the value to the customers in the oilfield owner’s 
business model. 
In this case the Business Model Canvas describes how 
the use of partners affects the value creation delivered 
to the customers. In other words it describes how part-
ners or suppliers interact with the case company’s busi-
ness model. It can be argued that the above example is 
a network-based business model, hence, two or more 
partners affect the value proposition based on the key 
activities and resources of all stakeholders. In the case 
above, it is the oilfield owner’s business model that is 
at the core and the Business Model Canvas provides a 
good platform for understanding the key attributes of 
their business model. In another type of business model, 
two or more companies may pool their resources and ac-
tivities into a joint business model providing a joint value 
proposition for the customer as illustrated in figure 3.
Figure 3: Partners as substitutes on the back-end business model
Such a setup occurs in various contexts like for example 
joint ventures, business collaborations, co-branding 
of products etc. In such cases, the limitations of the 
Business Model Canvas become clear in the context of 
describing network-based value creation. The Business 
Model Canvas does not provide a detailed enough 
description of the actions and relationships occurring 
between the stakeholders, nor the financial structure 
and risk between the stakeholders.
Figure 4: Several business model add value
A third example of a network-based scenario is the 
“equal partnership model” where two or more part-
ners (in figure 4 exemplified by six Business Model 
Canvasses) add relevant core resources and activities 
into a joint business model creating a new “pure” 
network-based business model. These brief examples 
indicate a potential weakness of the Business Model 
Canvas when it comes to treating partners in rela-
tion to network-based business models, because the 
partners are creating business models in the network 
relationship itself. Furthermore, it may be problematic 
for understanding value creation flows that some cus-
tomers also can be treated as strategic partners. 
The DNA of a network-based business model
We hypothesize that network-based business models 
can be structured in different patterns, much like the 
existing literature on singular business models de-
notes (cf. Osterwalder and Pigneur 2009). However, in 
the network-based setting the characteristics of the 
stakeholders and the structure between them define 
the stakeholder patterns and are a part of what might 
be denoted the business model DNA. In this DNA, the 
stakeholders are the companies, organizations and 
individuals that make up the core company’s business 
model. 
Journal of Business Models (2014), Vol. 2, No. 1 pp. 105-121
112
Methodology and case description
Methods
In this section a case study is introduced to illustrate 
how a network-based business model arises and 
evolves and how crucial the awareness of the dimen-
sion of multiple collaborators is for the creation of 
a new business model. A Danish research program 
“International Center for Innovation” (ICI) was initi-
ated in 2007, ending in March 2013. The project aimed 
to inspire and assist participants in a development 
process of innovating new network-based global busi-
ness models and in providing a solid base for relevant 
qualitative data, parallel to a business and industry 
ambition of creating sustainable business models for 
the companies involved. The collaborating companies 
were structured into networks consisting of at least 5 
companies. Each network was followed for at period of 
at least two years. ICI has since 2007 followed and doc-
umented the development of 10 network-cases includ-
ing a total of 92 companies that were in the process of 
understanding their business model with the ambition 
to innovate their existing business models to become 
new global network-based business models.
The case study presented in this article is based on 
a longitudinal case study over a period of 3 years of 
a Danish start-up called Sky-Watch and its network 
partners in the ICI project called Eye in the Sky (EIS). 
The network of companies and individuals behind Core 
Company developed a new business model for drone 
helicopters. Sky-watch has about 20 employees and 
has an annual turnover of an estimated € 10 million. 
The longitudinal study of EIS was a longitudinal in-
terventionist  research project (Lukka 2005) which 
was combined with a series of non-interventionist 
type semi-structured interviews (cf. Yin 2003). The 
research group mainly followed the whole network, 
including the founders of Sky-Watch, the CEO and 
senior staff from the company, as well as selected 
partners, consultants and researchers. The project had 
a defined goal to globalize its drone helicopter product. 
During the research project, there have been numerous 
meetings, workshops, reports and semi-structured 
interviews,  which are recorded and/or documented 
with minutes, pictures or video. The terminology  of 
the business model was introduced to all participants, 
and especially the use of  the Business Model Canvas 
(Osterwalder & Pigneur 2009), and narratives exempli-
fying existing, successful business models. 
The evolution of “Eye in the Sky” 
network
The following is an account of how the Eye in the Sky 
(EIS) network evolved through a series of phases. This 
case study illustrates how the business models of the 
related companies affect one another and how they 
form the value creation of the core company. The Eye 
in the Sky (EIS) network was one of the first projects in 
ICI and is a remarkable example on how a new business 
arises from a network of companies supported by a pub-
lic innovation program. From the start in the ICI project, 
it was the assumption that the ideal network pattern 
for a network-based business model would follow the 
structure of a so-called “partner business model” figure 
1, where it was hypothesized that at least five partners 
added their core resources and activities into a joint 
business model creating a pure network-based business 
model. 
This ideal network pattern was the platform for found-
ing a new network based business model that in the 
case of the “Eye in the Sky network” evolved in a num-
ber of network stages providing us significant data 
showing how the network dimension evolves in stages. 
Phase 1. The birth of a new network based busi-
ness model
The Eye In the Sky network was initiated by 
Access2Innovation, a research program situated at 
Aalborg University with the aim of bringing together 
NGOs, universities and private companies in a triple 
helix construction, in order to contribute with a series 
of innovative solutions for the work done by relief 
organizations in third world countries. In the spring 
of 2008, five companies were invited to take part in 
a project working with a product development idea 
at the Department for Automation and Control at 
Aalborg University. The idea was originally identified 
by DanChurchAid’s Humanitarian Mine Action group, a 
Danish NGO.
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Figure 5: The partner business model
The starting point of the dialogue was an autonomous 
mine-seeking drone helicopter developed at Aalborg 
University. DanChurchAid had vast experience in land-
mine seeking and landmine removal, and could there-
fore provide knowhow. Relatively quickly they rejected 
the sustainability of the idea because their experience 
told them that such areas often were often prone to 
heavy competition. They instead identified a need for 
aerial photography to map out areas and creating an 
automated overview. These data are often outdated or 
not existing for landmine-infested areas in developing 
countries. 
Combining the idea of an airborne mine-seeker and the 
demand for areal photos spawned the idea of a small 
versatile unmanned drone helicopter, which could take 
the required aerial photos of the minefields. With the 
project defined, the notion of a pure network-based 
business model was initiated by identifying which key 
resources and activities were necessary for developing, 
producing and manufacturing the drone helicopter. 
This led to the gathering of 5 partners; Mekan con-
tributing with mechanical competences, essential to 
manufacturing the first prototype. Danish Aerotech 
having competences on the manufacturing of mechani-
cal, structural and electrical components for airplanes 
and the design of these. Additionally, they had expe-
rience with airplane and helicopter maintenance, and 
provided especially the mechanical knowledge and the 
maintenance of flying units had relevance to the pro-
ject. GomSpace worked on components for satellites 
and the control hereof, offering knowledge on power 
source for the drone. NetImage had expertise deliver-
ing web-based solutions within e-trade, e-service and 
digital billing, and had therefore competences within 
data control and data-structure, along with compe-
tences within construction of the user interfaces to be 
utilized in the control of the helicopter. SpaceCom had 
knowhow in the field of satellite communication and 
radio connections, which were vital for the communi-
cation between the control-unit and the helicopter, 
and for controlling the geo-referencing of the picture 
material. DanChurchAid was, as mentioned, providing 
the demand for the product, and therefore constituted 
the reference customer for the drone. As such they 
were treated as a partner too, because of their ability 
to provide knowhow on the customer value proposition 
needed.
The five companies all had a natural interest in the pro-
ject because their individual contributions were similar 
to what they were doing in their existing businesses, 
and at the same time not competing with their exist-
ing market. Furthermore another motivation was that 
the financial crises had started kicking in, and all of the 
involved companies were experiencing tougher times 
due to a downturn in the business cycle. This added 
to the interest for the project and the expectation of 
getting development activities fully funded by ICI was 
welcomed. This led to the start of the development of a 
prototype of the drone, and during this work it became 
clear that in order to lift the project each and every 
partner would have to commit to investing part of his 
or her own capital too. In this phase of the network, we 
identify elements of the problems that Zott and Amit 
(2007) encounter in relation to the counterproductive 
problems when entrepreneurs attempt to incorporate 
both efficiency- and novelty-centered design elements 
into their business models.
Phase 2. A Shake and Bake setup
The project was left in a critical state because the part-
ners started losing interest in it. This was primarily due 
to the fact that they had been given the impression that 
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the development would receive full external funding via 
the ICI project, which was a misunderstanding. After a 
period of standstill, one of the employees started rais-
ing money for the project on his own. As the project 
was in a seed phase, only few funding opportunities 
were available. However, he managed to convince his 
father to invest and at the same time involved a local 
business incubator as a source of syndicated funding. 
This led to the registration of a separate company, Sky-
Watch A/S. 
The partners were still relevant to the project of devel-
oping a drone helicopter, but only a one of them was 
willing to invest money in the project. Therefore, the 
network making up the business model changed from 
the pure network model to what could be defined as a 
shake a bake setup (fig 6). 
Figure 6: The shake and bake model
The shake and bake setup differs from the pure setup 
by having an entity that is the project owner, and that 
only assembles the ingredients from the other part-
ners, combining their resources and activities into the 
final product. An ideal shake and bake setup is owned 
by all or most of the relevant stakeholders making up 
the business model or the stakeholders have some 
other significant incentive committing them to the 
project. In this case the “non owning partners” were 
still committed to the project through the anticipation 
of receiving a subsidy for product development, alter-
natively creating a potential customer for their existing 
business. This phase is identical to Zott and Amit’s 
(2009) conception of a network-based business model, 
where there is a focal firm at the core of the network. 
Phase 3. A “normal” business model 
Most “normal” business models replicate the structure 
of the value chain, and thus consist of a central compa-
ny that buys raw materials and components etc. from 
suppliers and where external stakeholders interact and 
affect the business model through relationships and 
monetary and physical transactions. 
Figure 7: The normal Sky-Watch business model
Sky-Watch A/S was developing more and more into 
a separate company, devaluing the retention of its 
partners’ stakes in the. Due to its organic growth, Sky-
Watch started experiencing limitations in relying on its 
original partners, their technology and knowhow and 
identified the need of starting their own R&D depart-
ment, which took place in the summer of 2010. This led 
to a regular break with the shake and bake setup.
On the one hand, Sky-Watch experienced problems in 
relation to their original partners’ ability to deliver on 
time, which made it difficult to coordinate development 
and production. Most importantly, the software/hard-
ware solution previously employed was very difficult to 
configure to the original purpose with the drone. This 
was in part due to a poorly managed database, along 
with inflexible hardware. Sky-Watch realized that in 
order to build a profitable business, they needed to be 
able to access several different customer segments. 
This in turn required them to take control on the central 
hard- and software competences, in order to produce a 
solution that was flexible enough to be quickly adapted 
to new market segments. Concurrently, this would also 
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increase the value of the firm, as they would come to 
possess a range of vital product competences within 
their field.
Many of the electrical components were bought off 
the shelf, while central circuit boards were designed 
in-house and subsequently made to order from suppli-
ers. The manufacturing of the shell was to be handled 
by suppliers, based on the blueprints from Sky-Watch. 
Yet, the demand for rapid prototypes and the unrea-
sonable costs associated with small batch productions 
later led the company to acquire a 3D printer. This was 
in part used to manufacture prototypes, but also to 
produce special parts for limited batch productions.
This entailed a large substitution of partners in and 
around the business model. With the control system 
in-house, Gomspace became largely redundant, yet 
collaboration with this partner continued on various 
shared components. NetImage proved not to pos-
sess the necessary competences for designing a user 
interface for a helicopter, as this required significant 
knowledge on how a helicopter operated. Furthermore, 
Mekan proved less relevant, as a larger part of the 
new design was to be in plastic. Danish Aerotech con-
tinued as a central partner, as they worked within a 
non-competing product in a similar segment. In that 
respect, Danish Aerotech had significant insights into 
the legislation within the field, while Sky-Watch could 
provide them with insights into a new interesting mar-
ket segments. DanishChurchAid also continued as a 
partner, as they maintained an interest in the products 
and could help introduce Sky-Watch to the NGO seg-
ment. In that respect, they proved a valuable partner, 
by actively pushing the story of the collaboration to the 
press. This generated some attention towards the pro-
ject, which in turn provided legitimacy, which could be 
used towards military and other commercial segments.
As such, the network encompassing Sky-Watch was 
structured in such a manner that it was consistent 
with the changed structure and purpose of the firm. 
In that respect, a new network was configured based 
on the more value-chain based approach, in which Sky-
Watch would carefully choose which activities were 
essential to the company, and which were best served 
by outsourcing.
Phase 4. The channel partnership
As the drone moved closer to a commercial product 
ready for the market, Sky-Watch began looking thor-
oughly into the sales possibilities on the NGO market. 
This proved significantly difficult to penetrate, as 
NGO’s typically do not contain the means to make 
investments. Any investments are typically brought in 
through sponsorships of specific projects. This meant 
that the lead-time would be very long and wrought 
with uncertainty. Furthermore, sales to the UN-system 
required suppliers to have an established sales record, 
along with inventory stock and other resources, which 
Sky-Watch, at the time, simply did not possess. As a 
consequence, the firm began uncovering the possibili-
ties for serving other segments, especially focusing on 
industrial inspection and military usage. In that re-
spect, the company continued to emphasize a network 
approach, by searching for potential partnerships with 
organizations that had existing distribution and sales 
channels in those segments. Therefore, we denote this 
the “The Channel partnership” phase. This resulted in 
a partnership with a stakeholder that opened to sales 
and a service organization to the global market.
Phase 5. Moving towards a Platform-based busi-
ness model. 
In our work with Sky-Watch we introduced the idea of 
a “platform business model”.  This is a business model 
where the product becomes a platform for new busi-
ness models and at the same time provides value for 
existing customers. An example of a successful plat-
form is Apple’s products. When Steve Jobs back in 2010 
introduced the Ipad he showed us a new product and 
at the same time manifested their business model as 
being a digital supermarket. In the process of working 
with the Apple-metaphor the company began uncover-
ing more application possibilities, which emphasized 
the potential of the product. Through talks with differ-
ent agents in different business segments that could 
be related to the drone helicopter, many different 
possibilities surfaced. However, each and every one of 
these different application possibilities would require 
specialized equipment beyond the current camera 
functionality.
This made Sky-Watch realize that fulfilling this busi-
ness potential would be extremely difficult. They would 
have to develop or purchase specific components and 
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reconsidering what constituted their core competen-
cies. Rather than only considering themselves to be 
a development company specialized within UAV heli-
copter solutions, they realized that their competences 
were not necessarily specific to helicopter drones. 
Rather, it was the actual control of autonomous units 
that was their core competence. This indicated that the 
control and guidance competences of the firm could be 
applied to other units, for example drone submarines. 
Yet, the helicopter solution remained the core product, 
which was to drive the firm forward. This necessitated 
that the product was finished, manufactured and dis-
tributed. As such, the firm had laid out the groundwork 
for a two-sided business model, in which one targeted 
selling control and guidance competences, while the 
other targeted the helicopter solution. In order to build 
profitability, the firm chose to focus specifically on 
the helicopter solution, by building production capac-
ity and distribution network for the helicopter spe-
cifically. Through this platform-based business model, 
Sky-Watch was able to turn potential competitors 
into customers, thus replicating one the three ways 
companies can compete through their business model 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2011). 
Figure 8: The channel partnership
integrate the necessary data treatment processes, 
associated with areas which they were not competent 
in. The solution was a new business model devel-
oped in collaboration with ICI. The helicopter was to 
be considered a basic unit, which contained different 
possibilities for attaching other components. Thereby, 
the functionality could be extended significantly. On 
the product level, this meant that the helicopter was 
to contain new functionalities, which would enable the 
unit to send data back to the control station along with 
the ability to control the attached equipment.
In that respect, Sky-Watch changed character. From 
having been a company focused on visual documen-
tation through a camera, this functionality became a 
subcomponent in the guidance of the helicopter, on 
to which other components could be attached. In that 
respect, the firm created a platform where the possi-
bilities would be highly dependent on the application 
possibilities developed by other partners. This enabled 
Sky-Watch to overcome the limitations they previously 
operated under, in relation to spreading the product to 
new segments. This would just require them to find the 
right partners to develop the application possibilities.
The context for this is also that Sky-Watch began 
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Discussion and concluding remarks
The empirical section above is a detailed elaboration of 
the implementation process of a new network-based 
business models. It illustrates the involved entrepre-
neurs managed the uncertainties they were confronted 
with in their innovation process through five consec-
utive phases. Most importantly, it illustrates how the 
changes in network configuration over the five depicted 
phases challenge the existing frameworks for generat-
ing and analyzing business models. Particularly the 
application of the Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur 2009) and how it incorporates the rela-
tionships between stakeholders and their respective 
impacts on each other’s value creation and value con-
figurations are advanced.
Through the research conducted on the 10 network-
based business models constituting the ICI project, 
several start-up business models have been analyzed. 
Initial evidence suggests that they often have a very 
poor overview over the relationships between the 
activities performed, the necessary resources, and 
how to configure the involvement of partners in their 
business model. The Sky-Watch case study presented 
in this article suggests that the entrepreneurs’ ability 
to understand the business model and the ability to 
manage the network-evolution pattern are key success 
factors. Sky-Watch’s success is particularly due to their 
ability to adapt the business model continuously and 
to understand and coordinate activities, resources, and 
how partners became involved in value creation.
In the first phase of the EIS network, the network of 
stakeholders took the form of a pure network. Here the 
core business model becomes a fusion of actors’ ac-
tivities, resources and partners. In the initiation phase 
they had not taken a position on the future form of the 
company but rather focused on how the stakeholders 
could create a joint product. The association/glue be-
tween the partners was a potential project financing, 
whereby the individual stakeholders would get subsi-
dized for product development. When reality showed 
a more complicated financing structure, the network 
gradually dissolved. At the same time the stakehold-
ers kept sympathy for the project they themselves had 
helped to set up, which meant that the “new company” 
Sky-Watch could create a shake and bake model where 
they were able to capitalize on the goodwill from the 
initial stakeholders. 
In the ICI project three networks that attempted to 
maintain a network-based business model in a pure 
form with a varying number of key stakeholders. 
However none have been successful. Among the key 
problems is that it is difficult to create an ownership 
model and it is difficult to find projects where stake-
holders are able to mix their existing business models 
to something new, without the new business models 
potentially interfering, hurting or directly cannibalizing 
their existing business. 
Sky-Watch established itself initially as a Shake and 
bake setup. It enabled them to have access to resources 
and activities through the involvement of committed 
stakeholders. This simultaneously reduced the need 
for a number of costly resources such as know-how, 
production equipment and technology, at the same 
time reducing the need for capital. The shake and bake 
setup enabled them to successfully create proof of 
concept and gain access to additional financing. Finally, 
through the platform-based business model imple-
mented in phase five, Sky-Watch were able to turn 
potential competitors into customers, thus replicating 
the mantra of Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2011, 8) 
who exclaim that the ability to build complementari-
ties with rivals’ cycles can result in substitutes turning 
into complements. This is precisely what Sky-Watch 
had succeeded in doing.
When juxtaposed to Stabell & Fjellstad’s (1998) three 
types of value configurations, the Sky-Watch case il-
lustrates how the network evolves from a value shop 
configuration to a value network configuration over 
the five network phases. This is surprising, as the 
pure network form starting out in phase one and the 
platform-based business model form ending in phase 
five each lend themselves more naturally to the op-
posite. The explanation is perhaps that the explorative 
nature of the network in phase one has a higher impact 
on the choice of value configuration. However, part of 
the explanation in this case study is the way in which 
the partners were joined and the particularities of the 
network partners, including their objectives for enter-
ing the initial research project. One might ponder if this 
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company had existed at all today if there had not have 
been a misunderstanding as to how the finance and 
subsidy structure at the beginning of the project was 
set up? As such this study touches upon the missing 
focus on networks in entrepreneurial contexts identi-
fied by Stuart and Sorensen (2007), who argue that a 
disproportionate quantity of research focuses on the 
consequences of networks at the expense of research 
on their origins.  
The Sky-Watch case likewise shows us how a new 
network-based business model is implemented and le-
gitimated through the application of storytelling about 
successful metaphors of doing business – in our case 
the platform-based business model applied by Apple 
and Groupon. The development of new interdisciplinary 
networks like for example Apples, however, contains a 
number of barriers and challenges going forward - both 
for businesses and for researchers. A significant para-
dox is, that although network-based business models 
have the potential to become vital catalysts of value 
creation through by becoming a hub for innovation and 
development of global business models, very few com-
panies are potentially ”leveraged” to practice the inno-
vation of business models in networks. It goes without 
saying that companies are ”handicapped” by their 
corporate culture and not least their “learning culture” 
which is typically characterized by hierarchy, ”single 
business model thinking,”, planning, and push and pull 
economy. It may require an entirely new knowledge set 
to cope with the ”multiple collaboration” and ”multi-
business model” economy (see also Lindgren, Taran 
& Boer 2010). However, it is not enough to be able to 
get the ideas and concepts for new business models 
”merged” together - but it is also necessary to act on 
them commercialize them quickly, globally - and thus 
to different markets. As such, this article also contrib-
utes to understanding the institutional factors both 
favoring and impeding the emergence and success of 
network-based business models. The success in this 
particular network-based business model lies in the 
ability create multiple collaboration, by Rindova et al. 
(2012) denoted configuring partner portfolios.  
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